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Abstract: This paper develops a framework for analyzing and comparing privacy and privacy protections 
across (inter alia) time, place, and polity and for examining factors that affect privacy and privacy 
protection. This framework provides a way to describe precisely aspects of privacy and context and a 
flexible vocabulary and notation for such descriptions and comparisons. Moreover, it links philosophical 
and conceptual work on privacy to social science and policy work and accommodates different 
conceptions of the nature and value of privacy. The paper begins with an outline of the framework. It 
then refines the view by describing a hypothetical application. Finally, it applies the framework to a real-
world privacy issue—campaign finance disclosure laws in the U.S. and in France. The paper concludes 
with an argument that the framework offers important advantages to privacy scholarship and for 
privacy policy makers. 
1. Introduction 
There is a substantial popular concern about privacy in light of technological advances, greater sharing 
of information via social networks, and increased power of state and non-state actors to collect 
information about individuals and institutions. That concern coincides with a growing body of privacy 
scholarship spanning a broad range of disciplines. One area of inquiry concerns making comparisons of 
privacy and protections in different places or at different times, for example across national boundaries 
(Bellman et al. 2004;Regan 2010; Bennett 1992; Altman 1977; Spiro 1971). A related line of inquiry 
concerns contextual factors that affect privacy protections and privacy rights. For example, whether the 
search of one’s briefcase constitutes a privacy violation depends on the setting in which it occurs: an 
airport security zone, a public sidewalk, or elsewhere (Nissenbaum 2010). Although these lines of 
scholarship are important and growing, they are in their early stages. This paper seeks to advance the 
scholarship in making privacy comparisons by providing a framework and conceptual foundation for 
defining and identifying aspects of privacy and its context in order to better analyze privacy, privacy 
protections, and privacy rights.  
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The framework we provide accomplishes several things. First, and most important, it provides a way to 
describe with precision particular aspects of privacy and privacy’s context. It also allows one to compare 
privacy in different settings according to variables such as time, location, and polity. To do so, it provides 
a flexible vocabulary and notation to facilitate such descriptions and comparisons. The framework 
provides, so far as possible, a morally neutral way of describing and comparing privacy states, and hence 
does not assume the answers to any questions about the moral importance of privacy in particular 
cases. Finally, the framework provides a way to link philosophical and conceptual work on privacy to 
social science and policy work by providing a tool for describing and comparing privacy that both 
instantiates aspects of the philosophical literature and can accommodate different conceptions of the 
nature and value of privacy itself.  
The paper begins with a discussion of a number of conceptions of privacy and privacy protections. It will 
argue that those conceptions are incomplete, fail to capture the full range of possibilities for the state of 
personal privacy, and do not allow for comparisons of privacy states. We offer instead a conception that 
focuses on privacy as a three-part relation between some individual or institution, some domain of 
information, and some other individual or institution with respect to whom the first has (or lacks) 
privacy. Put another way, the three-part relation is a general feature of privacy, and any privacy state 
(i.e., state of affairs regarding the privacy of some individual or entity) can be expressed in terms of that 
three-part relation. Rather than arguing for a particular conception of that relation, our view is 
compatible with a broad range of views about the nature and value of privacy. After setting forth this 
conception, we further specify the view by describing a hypothetical comparison across states. We then 
apply it to a real case, comparing campaign financing privacy in the U.S. and France. We conclude by 
arguing that this conception offers important advantages, by providing a common vocabulary, by not 
presupposing any particular view regarding the moral value of privacy, and by not making any 
assumptions about what sorts of entities can have privacy or have claims to privacy.  
1.1. Privacy and Context 
Several things motivate this paper. One is scholarly interest in comparing the laws and norms protecting 
privacy across different states or countries. Relatedly, there are important questions surrounding the 
explanations for such differences. To understand how and why countries offer different types of privacy 
protections it will be useful to have a framework to systematically describe those differences. This 
interest in differences in privacy norms is manifest in recent scholarship focusing on privacy’s context. In 
her recent book Privacy in Context, Helen Nissenbaum makes the case that privacy norms must be 
understood in terms of “contextual integrity.” She argues that privacy losses are distressing when they 
violate informational norms, which is to say when they violate norms restricting flows of information. 
Important here is that those norms are “systematically related to characteristics of the background 
social situation.”(Nissenbaum 2010, 129) She maintains that “disparities across societies, cultures, and 
historical periods may manifest in differences” in privacy and informational norms.(Nissenbaum 2010, 
134–35) Despite this emphasis on the social factors affecting informational norms, Nissenbaum leaves 
to “empirical social scientists” the question of how societal and cultural factors give rise to privacy and 
informational norms.  
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This paper takes up the task of understanding privacy’s context in three ways. First, it specifies several 
relevant aspects of any privacy context. Second, by imposing a structure on analyzing privacy it allows 
for comparisons across “societies, cultures, and historical periods” that may have different privacy 
norms, and allows one to analyze underlying causes of such differences. Thus, third, the framework 
provides a tool to predict what privacy norms will be and how they will change. 
The approach we take will run counter to important threads in contemporary privacy scholarship, such 
as those arguing that privacy is a “concept in disarray” and that looking at unifying threads across 
aspects of privacy is not a fruitful endeavor (Solove 2005, 477). Recently, for example, Daniel Solove has 
argued that instead of looking at privacy per se, we should take a problem-based or pragmatic approach 
to analyzing privacy, looking first to issues or disputes before doing the conceptual work because “the 
attempt to locate the essential or core characteristics of privacy has led to failure” (Solove 2008, 8).  
Note, though, that many morally important concepts are disputed and have no universally agreed-upon 
“core”—rights, speech, law, property, justice, well-being, and health being just a few. Surely, though, it 
is worthwhile to hone our conceptions and we can make progress doing so; that’s our task here.  
Solove is right that we should look to particular disputes, but our approach is to use particular disputes 
about privacy (or rights, or speech, or law, etc.) as a way to refine our conceptions. Hence, looking at 
particular privacy disputes is part of a process of broad reflective equilibrium necessary for reasoning 
about moral and political principles, which in turn depend on, rather than undermine, core concepts. 
Broad reflective equilibrium, as described by John Rawls and developed by numerous others, uses 
concepts and principles coupled with considered judgments about particular cases to arrive at the best 
overall coherence between concepts, principles, and considered judgments (Rawls 1999; Daniels 1979, 
258).1 Our framework is based on considerations of particular disputes and conceptions of privacy, and 
it aims to incorporate those disputes and conceptions into a framework that can coherently 
accommodate a wide array of conceptions while also providing demarcation criteria for privacy. And 
while one might argue that such demarcation criteria are a problem that pragmatic conceptions seek to 
avoid, even pragmatic conceptions must deploy some conception of privacy and some  set of relevance 
criteria. After all, one cannot write about privacy problems and disputes as privacy problems or disputes 
without some idea of what privacy is. Our framework seeks to make explicit just what those criteria are.  
Moreover, it is an important task to compare systematically privacy and privacy protections across time, 
place, and polity, in the same way that researchers have made such comparisons regarding liberty, 
rights, and rule of law. Doing so requires operationalizing the thing to be compared, in this case privacy. 
But abandoning the attempt to draw a parsimonious conception of privacy forecloses our ability to do 
such empirical work. We need a model to study and evaluate different privacy regimes. That’s our goal 
here.  
The specificity provided by our framework can also be useful in developing indices measuring various 
aspects of privacy protections around the world. The ability to examine targeted areas of law and 
regulation represents a step along the way from rich, narrative accounts to more quantifiable 
descriptions. The framework allows pair-wise comparisons between countries, which can be compiled 
by researchers into rankings or indices. An analogous, well-known index, produced and updated 
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annually by Freedom House, measures democracy around the world (Freedom House 2013). Quantifying 
such a difficult and contested notion as democracy has contributed to the broader field of 
democratization and human rights studies. This has developed the field by encouraging meta-studies 
that audit the indices' performance over time (Gupta et al. 1994; Bollen 1993). Our framework cannot 
by itself result in the same outcome for privacy, but it does contribute to a literature that aims at 
comparison. 
 
2. The View 
The foundation of our framework is that any conception of privacy must account for three things that 
stand in some relation to one another. So, for example, Martijn Blaauw argues that privacy is 
fundamentally about some person or persons, some set of propositions about the first person, and 
some other person or persons who know, or do not know, the propositions in the set (Blaauw n.d.). On 
this view, in order to understand Zeke’s privacy in health information, we must account not just for 
Zeke, but also for some set of propositions regarding Zeke’s health (e.g., propositions regarding Zeke’s 
medical history, physiological traits, habits, and so forth) and for some other person or persons who 
knows, or does not know each of the propositions regarding Zeke’s health. The key point here is that 
simply describing Zeke as having or lacking privacy is incomplete without specifying the range of 
propositions regarding which he has (or lacks) privacy and the other persons with respect to whom he 
has (or lacks) privacy. This is important, for one will often have privacy in some respects but not others. 
Zeke may have privacy regarding the set of propositions concerning his health with respect to his 
coworker, but not with respect to his insurer. And he may lack privacy regarding the set of propositions 
concerning his health with respect to his insurer but retain privacy regarding the set of propositions 
concerning his reading habits with respect to his insurer. Understanding privacy as a three-part relation 
forces us to be specific. 
A related account is proffered in (Rubel 2011). Like Blaauw, Rubel argues that privacy should be 
understood as a three-part relation, though he articulates the relevant parts differently. On this view 
any particular instance of privacy must involve some person or persons P, some domain of information 
O, and some other person or persons Q. And for P to have privacy regarding O with respect to Q is for 
Q’s ability to make reasonable particularized judgments about P regarding O to be limited (Rubel 2011, 
278–79). Important for our purposes here is that by understanding privacy as necessarily involving three 
parts, we can use an expression such as POQ to denote any privacy instance or privacy state.  
The difference between the Blaauw account and the Rubel account concerns the nature of the privacy 
relation. On Blaauw’s view, privacy is a knowledge relation. If we let O be the relevant set of 
propositions concerning P, on Blaauw’s view, P will have privacy regarding O with respect to Q if, and 
only if, Q does not know the propositions in O. In contrast, on the Rubel account privacy is about 
reasonable, particularized inferences, such that P has privacy regarding O with respect to Q to the extent 
that Q’s ability to make reasonable particularized judgments about P and O is limited. Suppose, for 
example, that Q reads P’s medical record, which states that P has Lyme disease. It would under normal 
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circumstances be reasonable for Q to make the inference that P has Lyme disease, and hence P’s privacy 
regarding her health information (O) decreases with respect to Q. However, because Q can make such 
judgments without actually knowing propositions within the domain O, the Rubel account will recognize 
some cases as privacy losses that Blaauw would not so-recognize. Returning to the Lyme disease 
example, if P’s medical record states incorrectly that P has Lyme disease, Q’s reasonable inference would 
be false. Q would believe that P has Lyme disease and Q would be justified in that belief, but the belief 
would be false. Q therefore does not know that P has Lyme disease (for one cannot know something 
that is false). On a knowledge account of privacy, such that P’s privacy regarding O with respect to Q 
decreases only if Q gains knowledge of P regarding O, P’s privacy regarding his health status with respect 
to Q would not decrease. 
What is important, though, is that despite this disagreement about the particular nature of the privacy 
relation, both accounts understand privacy as involving a three-part, or POQ, relation. More strongly, 
understanding privacy as involving a three-part relation is compatible with any plausible account of the 
nature of the privacy relation. Consider two of the predominant views of privacy in the literature: first, 
that privacy is fundamentally about access to information, and second, that privacy is about control of 
information. On access accounts, privacy turns on whether others physically access, cognitively access, 
or have the ability to physically or cognitively access one’s information. Thus, on access accounts, a 
person’s privacy does not depend on whether one has the ability to prevent others from impinging her 
privacy.2 On control views, one’s having privacy depends on whether one has the ability to decide who 
can access information about her. So, one can lose privacy if information about her is dispersed (and 
hence out of her control), even if others do not or cannot actually access that information.3 Notice, 
though, that on either type of view, we can articulate some person P, some domain of information O, 
and some person or persons with respect to whom P has privacy regarding O. On access views, P will 
have privacy regarding O with respect to Q if Q’s access to O regarding P is limited in the relevant way. 
On control views, P will have privacy regarding O with respect to Q if P has the power to control whether 
Q can access information in O regarding P. 
Another view, prominent in the legal scholarship, abandons any attempt to articulate a single 
conception of privacy, instead maintaining that privacy is either a variety of things, or a cluster-concept, 
or a family-resemblance concept. This possibility can also be accommodated by the POQ framework. 
Solove (2002) argues that different conceptions of privacy are appropriately employed in different 
circumstances. For example, Solove maintains that a court’s ruling that a newspaper did not violate a 
soccer player’s privacy by publishing a photograph in which the player’s genitalia were inadvertently 
exposed during a game mistakenly applied a secrecy conception of privacy, when a different conception 
(perhaps an access conception) would have been appropriate.4 Similarly, he argues that courts’ 
determinations that disclosure of information by third-parties to police does not constitute a search 
under the Fourth Amendment are the result of an inappropriate application of an invasion conception of 
privacy.5 The idea is that there are lots of different ways in which privacy might diminish, and we cannot 
conclude that privacy has not diminished merely on the ground that one aspect of privacy has not 
diminished. Notice, though, that we can still denote privacy instances in our POQ formulation, even 
though privacy might involve secrecy, or invasion, or something else altogether. All we must do is 
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specify the particular privacy facet we are concerned about. So, if we are concerned with secrecy, the 
POQ relation will denote P’s maintaining secrecy regarding domain of information O with respect to all 
other Ps. If we are concerned with invasion, POQ will denote P’s freedom from Q’s invasion of domain O, 
regardless of whether O is secret or not.  
Put another way, despite the variation among philosophical conceptions of privacy, each can be 
understood in terms of a three-part relation. One must merely specify what the three-part POQ relation 
denotes (control, access, knowledge, particularized judgments, secrecy, and so forth). Below we suggest 
that each different conception of privacy should be represented by a different term in a function with P, 
O, and Q. For example, privacy as access can be represented as 𝛼𝑃𝑂𝑄  . Thus, understanding privacy as a 
three-part relation internalizes and forces one to specify several necessary facets of privacy’s context. As 
we will see below, this allows one to isolate, compare, and explain other aspects of contexts. 
 
2.1. Individualistic conceptions, moral claims 
With this framework in mind, it is worth clarifying two matters. First regards the type of entity that can 
have privacy. Generally, privacy claims are understood to attach to individuals. That is, privacy is 
typically understood as the ability of an individual to restrict flows of information about her to others.6 
There are a variety of reasons for that to be the case. One would be humanistic concerns about 
prioritizing humans versus non-humans or institutions. Another would be that, in the U.S. at least, legal 
protections for privacy are often stated in individualistic terms.  
But it is by no means obvious that only individuals can have privacy or claims to privacy. Richard Posner, 
for example, argues that it is best (by which he means economically efficient) in many cases to allocate 
property rights in personal information—which is to say privacy rights—toward businesses rather than 
individuals (Posner 1984), as does Alan Westin (1967). In a recent case the U.S. Supreme Court 
determined that the personal privacy exemption under the Freedom of Information Act applies only to 
individuals, not to corporations.7 Although that case affirmed privacy as attaching to individuals, the fact 
that a lower court determined that the privacy exemption applied to corporations, and the fact that the 
Supreme Court’s ruling was based on statutory language (specifically referring to “personal” privacy) 
rather than the meaning of privacy simpliciter, suggest that it is at least plausible that institutions or 
groups can have privacy along with individuals.8 Moreover, there are lots of ways in which law and social 
norms already protect information flows regarding institutions: government secrecy, trade secrets 
protections, work product protections under freedom of information laws, attorney-client privileges, 
and so forth. We see no a priori reason to preclude understanding these as privacy protections.  
Second, the framework articulated here does not presuppose that privacy per se is valuable. Some 
conceptions of privacy build in value, either by understanding privacy as a right or as a realm that 
warrants protection from others’ incursion (Moore 2010, 26–27). Understanding privacy as a three-part 
relation as in Blaauw or Rubel is compatible with privacy having some inherent value; the domain (O) 
would in those cases be limited to information to which persons (P) have some claim regarding or 
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information that is valuable to P. But the framework neither presupposes nor depends on privacy having 
value. Because our framework does not presuppose that privacy is valuable, it will not directly address 
important aspects of some other views. For example, Nissenbaum includes transmission principles in her 
contextual integrity view (Nissenbaum 2010, 145–147). Such principles, however, are norms governing 
information flows and, hence, norms governing whether privacy may justifiably diminish or not. Because 
the framework here simply describes different privacy states, it leaves aside such principles. 
2.2.   Making comparisons 
Thus far, we’ve described different accounts of the nature of privacy and fixed a means of denoting 
privacy relations—POQ. That allows us to describe one privacy state in isolation. However, there are two 
problems. First, it is crucial for understanding privacy and context to be able to compare privacy across, 
for example, time, technology, place, and other relevant variables. Once researchers can make those 
comparisons with some precision, empirical social scientists can begin to account for the causes of any 
differences. Second, there are different conceptions of privacy (e.g., control, knowledge, access), all of 
which we want to be able to compare. That is, we do not want to tie this model to any particular 
conception of the nature of privacy. 
In order to accommodate this last problem, we can use terms to represent particular conceptions of 
privacy that might obtain in any POQ relation. Hence, let 𝛼 represent an access account of privacy, and 
𝛼POQ represent a particular three-part privacy relation under that conception. The following is a 





Conception of privacy Associated symbol 
Access 𝛼 
Control 𝜅 
Particularized judgment 𝜋 
Knowledge 𝑣 
 
Consider the case of patient P’s privacy regarding health information. We might want to compare P’s 
privacy in that regard with respect to various entities. So, P likely has relatively little privacy regarding 
health information with respect to their doctor, but P might have more privacy in this regard with 
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respect to neighbors. To represent this difference we will need to expand our formula. Let P denote a 
normal patient, O1 denote medical information, Q1 denote P’s doctor, and Q2 denote P’s neighbor. In the 
normal case, the following will be true:  
𝛼𝑃𝑂1𝑄1 < 𝛼𝑃𝑂1𝑄2  
That is, normal patients’  privacy regarding their medical information with respect to their doctor will be 
less than normal patients’ privacy regarding their medical information with respect to their neighbors. 
Now, let O2 denote gardening habits. Likewise, the following will be true: 
𝛼𝑃𝑂2𝑄1 > 𝛼𝑃𝑂2𝑄2  
That is, patients’ privacy regarding gardening habits with respect to neighbors will be less than patients’ 
gardening habits with respect to their doctors.  
This example simply analyzes a single type of subject (P) across different domains (O) and third parties 
(Q). The framework, though, helps us describe privacy relations according to variables such as time and 
location. Consider, for example, records of persons’ real property. In the U.S. municipalities’ real 
property records are public records and anyone may access those records. Prior to the digitization of 
those records, the uptake of the Internet, and the move to place public records online, one generally 
had to make a request by mail, by fax, or in person to receive those records, and one generally had to 
pay for processing, photocopying, and postage. Now, in many places one can simply enter a person’s 
name, a property address, or a parcel number in an online form and receive property records 
immediately and for free. We can represent this difference using our framework.  
Let P represent a property owner in Greenacre, a municipality in the U.S. Let O represent information 
about real property (tax assessment value, property description, purchase price, encumbrances, and so 
forth). Let Q represent the general public. Suppose that in the pre-Internet era (T1) Greenacre kept its 
property records in paper files, which could be accessed in person at City Hall during standard business 
hours, for a standard fee. However, as of 2010 (T2) Greenacre keeps all of its property records in an 
electronic database, which may be accessed by members of the public on the city’s website free of 
charge.   
We can easily see the relation between privacy in Greenacre before and after the database with a 
simple table:  
Variable  T1  T2 
Privacy relation 𝛼𝑃𝑂𝑄 > 𝛼𝑃𝑂𝑄 
 
We can replace the table by modifying the notation, including not only the privacy relation 𝛼𝑃𝑂𝑄, but 
also adding the relevant variable, in this case time (T1 and T2). Hence, we can represent the overall 
privacy relation of a property owner regarding information about her property with respect to the 
general public as follows:  
 
 
DRAFT—Please cite to revised and final version, forthcoming in JASIST—Journal of the Association for 






We can also construe the change at Greenacre as a change in technology rather than as a change in 
time. That is, we can analyze it as the difference between paper-based records and digitized, online 





Indeed, a similar notation can be used to represent whatever comparison one wishes to make. So, 
rather than comparing privacy in Greenacre over time or across technologies, we might instead wish to 
compare privacy regarding property information between Greenacre and Blueacre. If Blueacre, even at 
this late date, has not created an Internet-accessible electronic database of its property records, the 





We can also combine them: 
𝛼𝑃𝑂𝑄





𝐵𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒 ∙ 𝑇2 > 𝛼𝑃𝑂𝑄
𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒 ∙ 𝑇2
 
Hence, the framework here specifies and isolates aspects of privacy’s context, and is flexible enough to 
account for different variations. These include, but are not limited to, place, time, and technological 
developments. 
3. A Case Study: Campaign Finance Regulation in the United 
States and France  
The usefulness of the framework becomes clearer when we look at the settings in which privacy 
matters. One such setting is campaign finance. An important topic in any time, recent changes in U.S. 
law following the Citizens United case has made the politics of presidential campaign finance a 
particularly central issue to American politics (Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 2010). 
The regulation of campaign finance – both the inflows to and outflows from campaign treasuries – 
revolves largely around two substantive areas: first, limitations on contributions and spending; and 
second, disclosure requirements regarding such receipts and spending of campaign funds.  
We focus on the second area, providing a way to describe formally and to compare candidates’ relative 
ability to keep confidential the information about campaign funding—a candidate’s (P) privacy regarding 
campaign funding (O) with respect to third parties (Q). We compare the state of this privacy relation in 
the presidential campaigns in United States and France.9 
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Understanding this privacy relation is important for several reasons. First, the non-disclosure of donor 
information and the amounts they contribute to a campaign deprives other actors of information about 
systemic power relations within the polity. Consider the importance of learning about donations to a 
legislative candidate from a corporation regulated by a legislative committee chaired by that candidate. 
Second, information about finances not only affects election outcomes, but can also incentivize the 
official behavior of elected officials. Finally, privacy claims related to government action, including 
electioneering, have implications for the character of liberal democracy. 
One way to undertake this type of assessment is to provide narrative, descriptive accounts of laws and 
regulation. That is where we begin. Then, we add to this narrative by deploying the framework we have 
established to make clear the comparisons of privacy.  
3.1. Narrative account 
In the United States, federal campaign laws and regulations are overseen principally by the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC). These laws require candidates for president to disclose the total amount of 
donations received from individuals. Disclosure of donor identifying information (including name, 
occupation, address, and employer) is required for those who contribute $200 or more to a campaign; 
for those contributing less, the campaign may keep confidential such identifying information.10 All of the 
data disclosed to the state, in addition to being made available for inspection and enforcement actions 
by the FEC and any other relevant federal agencies, are also made available to the public via federal 
government11 and third-party search engines.12  
This differs from the situation in France in several ways. The French election regulation enforcement 
authority – the CNCCFP13 – sets out rules on how campaigns must document both receipts and 
expenses.14 These rules require that the campaign retain documentation (e.g., copies of checks, receipts 
issued for cash donations, credit card receipts) to prove to the government that the campaigns are not 
taking donations from non-physical persons; corporate (i.e., non-personal) donations are forbidden by 
law.15 Additionally, the CNCCFP requires campaigns to compile and submit a list containing the name of 
all donors and the amount each contributed. 
Following each election, the CNCCFP audits the required documentation of the campaigns, and issues an 
activity report. In years where presidential elections have taken place, this annual report contains 
donation totals by individuals, but the government does not make donor information available to the 
public. Members of the public may request, in writing and for a standard copying fee, the summary 
donor lists filed by the campaigns, but the CNCCFP redacts all names and other identifying information 
of donors prior to releasing the list.  
There is, therefore, a general similarity in individual donation disclosure requirements with respect to 
governmental authorities, in this case the FEC and CNCCFP. However, American presidential candidates’ 
campaigns have more privacy regarding the identity of their donors than similarly situated French 
candidates, given the sub-$200 donor exception. Both countries do require individual donor information 
for all donors over $200. As to public disclosure, France differs in that it demands, but does not disclose 
to others, all individual donors’ names. The public and the press, in France, are deprived of the 
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individual names, whereas their American counterparts are given access to significantly more 
information about which individuals and interests exert financial influence within presidential election 
campaigns.  
3.2. Applying Our Framework  
The narrative account provides an overview of similarities and differences between the two countries 
with respect to this privacy claim. Our model can parsimoniously present this information in the 
following way. 
Let us examine, first, overall privacy for American and French presidential campaigns. Let P denote a 
presidential candidate’s campaign. As to types of information, O, let O1 denote individual-donor totals, 
and let O2 denote individual-identifying donor information. As to the third-party to whom information is 
disclosed, Q, let Q1 denote the country’s campaign finance enforcement authority (i.e., the state), and 
let Q2 denote the general public.  

















Using our model, the reader is able, at a glance, to note that in two of the situations the privacy state of 
presidential candidates is identical: in both countries, information about total donations received from 
individuals must be disclosed both to the state and to the public. It is the third and fourth equations that 
show us the state of inequality between candidates in the two countries: (1) candidates have greater 
privacy in the United States, due to the lack of mandated disclosure to the state of the identifying 
information for donors giving between $1 and $199; and (2) French candidates have greater privacy with 
respect to the disclosure to the public of individual-identifying information, since the CNCCFP redacts 
this information from all reports disclosed to the public. 
The flexibility of the model allows us, however, to be more specific in our notation and to take account 
of these differences between the U.S. and France. Let O3 denote donor-identifying information for sub-
$200 donations, and let O4 denote donor-identifying information for donations of $200 and above. From 
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We’ll explicate these a bit. The first equation compares political candidates’ privacy regarding the 
identities of sub-$200 campaign donors with respect to the state. American candidates have greater 
privacy in this regard, since the U.S. does not require disclosure of such donations to the FEC. The 
second equation compares political candidates’ privacy regarding the identities of sub-$200 campaign 
donors with respect to the public. French and American candidates have the same degree of privacy in 
this regard. In the U.S., the FEC does not have that information and hence cannot reveal it. In France, 
the CNCCFP redacts that information in public reports. The third equation compares political candidates’ 
privacy regarding the identities of campaign donors who give $200 or more with respect to the state. 
Again, French and American candidates have the same degree of privacy in this regard; both states 
require campaigns to disclose such information to the state election authorities. Finally, the fourth 
equation compares political candidates’ privacy regarding the identities of campaign donors who give 
$200 or more with respect to the general public. French candidates have greater privacy in this regard; 
the CNCCFP redacts such information in its reports whereas the FEC makes such information available in 
its databases.   
Our framework also allows for variation in the variable P, to permit privacy comparisons between 
different actors. To provide an example, we use the same legal situation with respect to campaign 
finance in France and the United States, but from the perspective of the individual donor—a developing 
concern, referred to as “political privacy”, in campaign finance and democratic governance. Let P1 
represent a sub-$200 donor, and let P2 represent a $200-and-above donor. Let O represent the donor’s 
personally identifying information. Finally, as above, let Q1 represent the state, and let Q2 represent the 

















Note that in this case the privacy states, viewed from the position of the donor, are similar to the 
privacy states as viewed from the position of the candidate; that is, if P represented political candidates, 
the relations would be the same as above. This could have been otherwise, but the fact that the 
interests of the candidates and the donors overlap is helpful from the position of privacy analysts.  
It is also possible to make comparisons across contexts (here, between the U.S. and France) wherein two 
or more of the variables P, O, and Q vary, as well. We have, until now, avoided doing so, for the simple 
reason that the more one varies these when comparing across contexts, the less coherent the 
comparison becomes; holding variables constant across contexts imposes an internal consistency that 
motivates a comparison of truly like situations. That said, there are instances where a researcher might 
need to compare two different sorts of privacy relationships, in order to draw specific inferences, and 
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our notation scheme permits such cases. Continuing on the above analysis of individual donors’ privacy, 





Notice, in this comparison, that the identifying-informational privacy of a sub-$200 donor in the U.S. 
with respect to the state is equal to the privacy of a $200-and-above donor in France with respect to the 
general public. That is, in neither case is O, the identifying-information, disclosed to the third-party in 
question (Q1 and Q2). In the American case, the state remains ignorant as to the identity of the donor, 
P1,  because it does not collect such information, and in the French case, the public remains ignorant as 
to the identity of P2 because the state does not make such information available to the public.  
 
3.3. Toward social scientific explanations of variance 
This type of structured, rigorous analysis encourages us to look at privacy relations within specific 
situations: in particular places or times, or under various technological conditions. Once this work is 
complete, social scientists – and indeed all those who seek to determine the reasons behind the 
variations elicited – can treat the resulting privacy comparisons as bases for further research.  
For instance, once the privacy comparison related to presidential campaigns in the US and France 
presented above is established, scholars can seek to explain the causal factors behind the differences. It 
may well be that France’s political culture has been so influenced by the presence of a centralized, 
powerful state that its government is more likely to demand a fuller accounting of donations from its 
candidates. By comparison, Americans’ tendency toward skepticism, antagonism toward state action, or 
affinity for small-scale political actors may contribute to the exclusion of sub-$200 donations from 
federal reporting requirements.  
We can also imagine any number of further applications and comparisons, depending on the interest of 
the social scientist or other analyst. Perhaps computer scientists, information scientists, and designers of 
technological systems will wish to evaluate the privacy impacts of existing technologies with an eye 
toward predicting privacy outcomes of future technologies (see, e.g., Detweiler et al. 2011). Or 
sociologists may wish to look into the past to compare privacy states under various social regimes in 
order to make predictions about societal outcomes. Others may wish to examine privacy regimes in 
various historical periods to identify causes of differences in privacy protections.  
It is also worth noting that not developing a framework to operationalize the broadest notion of privacy 
would have negative consequences for developing policy and for the empirical work upon which policy 
depends. Some conceptions of privacy, either because they are incomplete or proceed a priori, exclude 
certain actors and privacy relationship. Actors that are systematically excluded—and hence ignored—
may include the socially, economically, or politically less-powerful. Our framework restores the full field 
of vision about privacy states, bringing to light the privacy states of any actor upon which the analyst 
wishes to focus. Privacy studies, under this pluralistic analysis, will be broader and more complete with a 
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framework that excludes neither certain relationships between previously ignored actors nor certain 
philosophical approaches to the nature of privacy. 
4. Objections and Limitations 
There are several potential objections to the framework offered here. Perhaps the most important is 
that the notation does not offer much advantage over narrative accounts describing and comparing 
privacy states. We see two primary advantages. First, while it is true that any privacy relation 
represented using the framework offered here can in principle be described in narrative form, narrative 
forms make it easier to skip over important aspects of privacy relations. In contrast, formalizing privacy 
relations forces one to be precise about who has (or lacks) privacy, the domain of information in which 
she has (or lacks) privacy, the other person(s) with respect to whom she has (or lacks privacy), and the 
type of privacy she has (or lacks). This forced precision is important in avoiding hidden ambiguities or 
vagueness. Consider, for example, one of the examples that purportedly shows the disarray in privacy 
conceptions. As noted, Solove argues that when a court determined that a newspaper’s publication of a 
revealing photograph of a soccer player did not constitute a privacy violation it made a mistake 
regarding the appropriate conception of privacy (i.e., applying a “secrecy” conception instead of 
something else). Simply describing the situation in a narrative form, one might say that at the time the 
photograph was taken, the player’s genitals were exposed to the public and, hence, the act of taking and 
publishing a photograph does not expose something new. Indeed, the court’s reasoning as to why the 
photograph was protected speech and not a privacy violation warranting restriction turns on the 
“public” nature of the event. 
The picture accurately depicted a public event and was published as part of a 
newspaper article describing the game. At the time the photograph was taken, 
McNamara was voluntarily participating in a spectator sport at a public place 
(McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, 1991). 
But eliding so easily between exposure in a public event at a single moment and exposure to the public, 
period, is impossible if we are being precise in the way required under our framework. So, let P be the 
soccer player, O be images of his genitalia, and Q be the general public. T1 will represent the period after 
the photograph was take but before it was published and T2 will represent the period after the 





Of course the court might still reason that the decrease in privacy is insufficiently weighty to override 
First Amendment protections, but it would have to do so by explicit appeal to underlying principles 
about the relative weight of speech and privacy loss rather than quickly dispensing with the privacy 
issue. Hidden ambiguities are often the source of moral disagreements (see Daniels (1979), 262-263). 
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A second advantage of our framework over narrative accounts is in advancing empirical social science 
regarding privacy. Narrative accounts can provide rich detail in small numbers of cases, but they become 
unwieldy when trying to make broader comparisons based on multiple cases. So, if we wanted to 
compare the privacy protections for, say, medical information in Western Europe and North America, 
we would need to look at various aspects of medical privacy practices, laws, and technologies in a 
variety of countries. Using our framework we could pick out a few relevant privacy relations and 
variables and compare across places. The result would be a set of tables, which would be relatively easy 
to scan and understand. A narrative account would have to describe each in detail, and would be more 
difficult to understand.  
This ability to compress lots of aspects of privacy across numerous variables gives rise to a second 
objection, namely that operationalizing a complex concept such as privacy will gloss over important 
nuances. While it is true that some aspects of privacy are not represented explicitly in our framework, 
the goal is to be able to analyze nuances effectively. Being explicit about a definite set of variables 
allows us to see nuances more clearly.  That the framework leaves out nuances is a feature not a bug; it 
forces commentators to define the context enough to see and examine nuances. Moreover, the 
framework is flexible so users can either add nuance or account for nuances within it. That is, the 
framework allows the user tremendous flexibility in the definition of the account being described and 
compared.  
5. Conclusion 
Our task here has been to advance privacy inquiry by providing a bridge between several discrete areas 
of privacy scholarship: work emphasizing the importance of privacy’s context, philosophical work 
regarding conceptions of privacy, and empirical social science looking at differences in privacy regimes 
and underlying causes of such difference. To do so we’ve offered a framework and conceptual 
foundation for isolating aspects of privacy and privacy’s context and for comparing other aspects of 
privacy’s context: privacy is a three-part relation between some person, persons, or entity P, some set of 
propositions or domain of information O, and some other person, persons, or entity Q with respect to 
whom P has privacy regarding O.  
We have argued that the framework is important insofar as it forces specification regarding these three 
necessary aspects of privacy and, hence, allows for comparing privacy across contexts such as time, 
location, and polity. Although it forces some specificity, it is flexible insofar as it allows comparisons of 
myriad contexts and accommodates different philosophical conceptions of the nature of privacy (access, 
control, particularized judgment, knowledge).   
Notes 
1. As Daniels puts it, wide reflective equilibrium is a method of producing coherence among an “order triple” 
of propositions: “(a) a set of considered moral judgments, (b) a set of moral principles, and (c) a set of 
relevant background theories” (Daniels 1979, 258). 
2. Examples of access accounts include (DeCew 1997; Powers 1996; Allen 1988, 15; Gavison 1984, 349–50; 
Parent 1983, 269).   
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3. Examples of control accounts include (Moore 2010; Westin 1967, 7; Rachels 1975). 
4. (Solove 2002, 1147–48) (Citing McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1991)). 
5. (Solove 2002, 1152–53) (Citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) and Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735 (1979)). 
6. This paper is about informational privacy. We leave aside the relation between informational privacy and 
decisional or constitutional privacy, which may involve information flows, but which also concern 
autonomy over certain kinds of decisions.  
7. Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T, 562 U.S. __ (2011). 
8. Id. at __;  Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T, 582 F. 3d 490 (3rd Cir. 2009). 
9. Our account ignores differences in the nature of the office of president from one country to the other, 
wanting to focus attention simply on the highest elected executive office in each political system. 
10. Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(A). 
11. Campaign Finance Disclosure Portal, Federal Election Commission. http://www.fec.gov/pindex.shtml. 
Accessed August 2013. 
12. Presidential Donor Lookup (2012), OpenSecrets.org. 
http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/search_donor.php. Accessed August 2013. 
13. The CNCCFP, Commission nationale des comptes de campagne et des financements politiques (National 
Commission for Campaign Accounts and Political Financing), is an independent administrative authority 
created by the French Parliament in 1990. The intent behind its existence in many ways mirrors that of 
the FEC in the United States, though its internal composition and decision-making procedures vary in non-
trivial ways. 
14. Commission nationale des comptes de campagne et des financements politiques (France). Mémento à 
l’usage du candidat et de son mandataire (2012), 13-19, 37, 
http://www.cnccfp.fr/docs/presidentielle/cnccfp_presidentielle_2012_memento_v20120322.pdf.  
15. French Electoral Code (Code électoral), Art. L52-8. 
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